Heterogeneity is likely to be an important determinant of the shape of optimal tax schemes. This article addresses the issue in a model à la Mirrlees with a continuum of agents. The agents dier in their productivities and opportunity costs of work, but their labor supplies depend only on a unidimensional combination of their two characteristics. Conditions are given under which the standard result that marginal tax rates are everywhere non-negative holds. This is in particular the case when work opportunity costs are distributed independently of income.
Introduction
The bulk of the theory of optimal taxation recommends that the marginal tax rate be everywhere positive: labor supply is distorted downwards, compared with laissez-faire. The conditions under which the result holds (continuous labor supply or intensive margin, unobserved productivity, constant opportunity cost of work, utilitarian planner with a redistributive motive towards lower incomes) have been thoroughly investigated (Seade (1977) , Seade (1982) , Werning (2000) , Hellwig (2007) ).
The purpose of the present paper is to describe how negative marginal tax rates can be optimal, keeping with the intensive setup largely studied in the literature, when there are multiple dimensions of heterogeneity. Indeed Mirrlees (1976) in its Section 4 indicates, along a line that will be pursued further here, that the sign of the marginal tax rate cannot be predicted when the agents in the economy dier along several dimensions of heterogeneity. Workers dier in both their productivities and opportunity costs of work. Under utilitarianism, heterogeneity comes into play through its impact on cardinal utilities. How social weights, or marginal utilities of income, vary with income determines the shape of the optimal tax scheme. Conditional on income, utility levels, and more importantly directly their derivatives with respect to income, may either decrease or increase with work opportunity costs. This may vary according to circumstances, depending on whether the cost is associated with poor living conditions (i.e. a handicap) or reects a taste for leisure or opportunities outside the labor market (such as gardening at home or black market activities). For a given income, the social weight is proportional to the expected marginal utilities, where the expectation is taken over the distribution of work opportunity costs at this income level. Therefore the social weight curve both depends on the specication of the cardinal utility function and on how the distribution of work opportunity costs changes with income.
The fact that heterogeneity can blur the redistribution motive, through the possible correlation between ability and onerousness of work, has been discussed in models where agents have a nite number of types. A pioneer work is that of Stiglitz (1982) who shows that the high-skilled individual should face a negative marginal tax rate if the low-skilled individual's upward incentive constraint binds, which is the case if social weights are increasing in type. The importance of this observation for policy was pointed out in Cu (2000) , who is the rst to explicitly link social weights to the opportunity cost of work, using alternative choices of cardinal utilities. In a model with four types, combining two values for productivity and two values for the cost of work, Boadway, Marchand, Pestieau, and Racionero (2002) showed how it can be optimal to have binding upward incentive constraints when high opportunity costs are associated with small social weights.
The present paper shows how intuitions derived from nite types models extend to the standard optimal taxation framework with a continuum of types, which is more appropriate to practical situations. In this setup, we revisit the analysis of Saez (2002) , making explicit the determinants of the social weights and linking them to the agents' heterogenous characteristics. In particular, we build on the result that negative marginal tax rates are only optimal at the bottom of the skill distribution if these individuals have below average social weights, a rather drastic condition. We show that this condition may hold rather naturally if (i) there is heterogeneity in utilities, holding income constant, and (ii) the heterogeneity reduces the social weights put on the low income types, relatively to those of the larger income types.
We consider a standard model à la Mirrlees where the workers' choices can be represented by a utility function which is separable in consumption and leisure.
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Although agents dier in productivity and work opportunity cost, their behavior is assumed to only depend on a unidimensional combination of the two underlying parameters, which avoids the technicalities that typically go with multidimensional heterogeneity. A similar shortcut has been used by Brett and Weymark (2003) in a continuum environment, while Beaudry, Blackorby, and Szalay (2006) tackles the full multidimensional issue in a model where there are a nite number of types.
The paper is in three parts. First, without any a priori assumptions on the relative weights given to the various agents in the economy, we describe the set of second best allocations. Each allocation is associated with a tax schedule.
Under regularity assumptions, we show that the rst order condition relating the 1 Our framework is more general than some of the studies in the previous literature: we allow for income eects, we do not assume linearity in leisure.
marginal tax rate to the social weights of the agents, familiar from optimal tax theory, also applies here with arbitrary exogenous social weights.
The second part of the paper relates the social weights to the underlying distribution of characteristics in the economy. It describes situations where the Mirrlees result, everywhere positive marginal tax rates, holds. This is the case, for instance, when the distribution of opportunity costs is independent of that of productivities, whatever the impact of these costs on the agents utilities.
The third part builds on Saez (2002) to show when negative tax rates are optimal. We provide a theoretical example where agents with low productivities exhibit a large spectrum of opportunity costs, and are better o, the larger their costs. We give a general formula for the social weight of the low skilled, as a function of the distribution of the heterogenous characteristics and of the derivative of marginal utility with respect to the heterogeneity parameter. Finally we illustrate the potential importance of heterogeneity on a simulation exercise grounded on UK data. We show that a small change in heterogeneity, from a standard error of the work opportunity cost of ¿ 100 at the bottom of the earnings distribution to ¿ 200 at the rst quartile, is enough to warrant negative marginal tax rates.
This indicates that more work and attention should be devoted to heterogeneity when designing optimal tax schemes.
Second best optimality in the Mirrlees model
We consider an economy with a continuum of agents. Agents dier by their opportunity costs of work and their abilities, respectively measured by the nonnegative numbers θ c and θ p . The overall utility U of an agent that earns a before tax income y leading to a nal consumption (or after tax income) c is
where θ = (θ c , θ p ) designates the agent's type. The utility of consumption u(c)
is increasing and concave in c. The second term measures the disutility from working. It is decreasing and concave in y, increasing in θ p , decreasing in θ c : the larger productivity, the less work is needed to achieve a given production level;
given y, the larger the cost of work, the smaller the utility. The government does not observe the agents' types θ and has to base redistri-bution solely on observed earnings, using a nonlinear tax scheme. A citizen who earns a before tax income y is left with an after-tax income c = R(y) = y − T (y), where T (y) denotes taxes net of benets. A measurable functionỹ(θ) is called an allocation. Given a consumption schedule R, an allocation such thatỹ(θ) maximizes u(R(y)) +ṽ(y, θ)
is incentive compatible. Such an allocation will be denotedỹ R (θ) to make explicit its relationship with R.
An allocation is feasible when aggregate production, the sum of theỹ R (θ), is equal to aggregate consumption, the sum of the R(ỹ R (θ)). The government problem is to choose the incentive compatible feasible allocation which is optimal given his redistributive motives.
We restrict our analysis to the case where the consumers' behaviors depend eectively on a unidimensional parameter α = A(θ). In general when there are several dimensions of heterogeneity and the government has only one dimension of observation (income), a major diculty is to identify the shape of the set of types that are associated with a given level of income, since this shape typically depends on the tax schedule. Here, the shape is given by the level curves of the function A, independently of R. Formally, the above utility function reduces to u(c) + v(y, A(θ)) = u(c) + v(y, α), where v(y, A(θ)) ≡ṽ(y, θ). 2 The function A is supposed to be increasing in productivity θ p and decreasing in the onerousness of work θ c . Then v is increasing in its second argument. We assume that the cross derivative v yα is everywhere positive, which implies that the indierence curves of the agents in the (c, y) space are single-crossing.
3 In this circumstance, it is known that incentive compatibility is equivalent to a simple monotonicity condition (for completeness we provide the proof in the Appendix). The value of utility at the maximum, or indirect utility, is denoted U R (α).
Lemma 1. A necessary and sucient condition for an allocation y to be incentive compatible is that it be nondecreasing in α. Furthermore, the indirect utility U R (α)
2 To distinguish the functions of α from those of θ, we put a tilde on the latter. 3 It would be of interest to know whether our analysis extends to situations where utility is not separable between consumption and leisure, as in Mirrlees (1971) or Hellwig (2007) . This would probably require a general version of the single-crossing assumption in the spirit of Edlin and Shannon (1998) .
is dierentiable at all but at most countably many points α, with
Both R(y R (α)) and U R (α) are nondecreasing functions of α. In general, when the agents not only have dierent productivities but also dier in their costs of providing a given labor supply y/θ p , the Mirrlees functionv(y/θ
The unidimensional restriction here is the assumption that in fact −v reduces to some v as above.
4 With a well designed incentive scheme, the government may infer the characteristic α of an agent from his income y, but it is unable, say for a large income and a large α, to know whether it comes from a high productivity type or a low cost of work type.
Given the information available to the government, all the agents of type θ = (θ c , θ p ) with the same α = A(θ) must be treated equally. The second best optimal allocations are incentive compatible allocations which maximize a weighted sum of the agents utility functions, with positive weights π(α) summing up to 1, subject to the government budget constraint.
5 Let G be the cumulative distribution function of the parameter α. We assume that G admits a density g which is continuous and positive on the interior
4 In an earlier version of the paper, we studied the situation where the disutility of work is isoelastic,v(y) = y 1+1/e /θ c . 5 To be precise, one gets all second best allocations when the weights describe the set of probability measures on the space of types. For notational simplicity, we write the programs below for probability measures that have a density with respect to the measure on types. The results are valid in the general case. 6 As pointed out by a referee, the multidimensional construction typically implies g(α) = g(α) = 0. This is discussed in Brett and Weymark (2003), p.2565. where λ is the multiplier of the budget constraint, i.e. the marginal cost of public funds.
A marginal admissible transformation, that does not change the tax payers' labor supplies, consists in uniformly increasing utility by some amount dU through a change in consumption dR(y) = dU/u (R(y)), for all y. Since the Lagrangian should be left unchanged after this transformation, it follows that
is the density of a probability measure G * .
To give a simple statement of the rst order condition for second best optimality, we associate with an allocation y R the modied weights:
Computed with the probability measure G * , the average modied social weight equals the cost of public funds:
Let p * (α) be the average value of the social weights of all the agents with idiosyncratic characteristics larger than α:
By construction, any second best allocation satises, for all α
If the average weights of the agents above α is smaller than λ, the weights of the agents below is larger than λ, and conversely. Also, at the lower boundary, p * (α) = λ. The rst order condition for the optimal tax rate at α, similar to formula (21) of Mirrlees (1971) , can then be expressed as follows. 7 7 In a previous version of this paper, Choné and Laroque (2007) , in a setup where the utility function is linear in consumption, we provide a full characterization of the set of second best Lemma 2. Let y be a second best allocation. Consider α in (α, α) where y is continuous and there is no bunching. Then
The proof in appendix derives the rst order condition at all points, including discontinuity points of y, and shows, under the additional assumption v αyy ≥ 0, that any second best allocation is continuous in the region where marginal tax rates are nonnegative.
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As a consequence of (4), the marginal tax rate supported by type α has the same sign as λ − p * (α). The formula, as discussed in Diamond (1998) for an economy with quasi-linear preferences, is associated with an increase dT in the marginal tax rate on the interval [α − dα, α], which reduces consumption by − dT dα for α in [α, α] . The left hand side of (4), once multiplied by g * (α) dT dα, corresponds to the distortion in labor supply that takes place in the interval
The right hand side, multiplied by g * (α) dT dα, is the change in the Lagrangian associated with the decrease in consumption above α: the government collects (1−G * (α)) dT dα, which is valued at the marginal cost of public funds λ, but the utilities of the concerned agents fall, which taking into account their social weights reduces welfare by (1−G * (α))p * (α) dT dα. This marginal transformation must leave the Lagrangian unchanged, which yields (4).
The sign of the marginal tax rate indicates how the incentive constraints bind.
The intuition, largely taken from Boadway, Marchand, Pestieau, and Racionero (2002) , is as follows. There is no distortion at α, and the incentive constraints are not binding when R = 1, i.e. from (4), when the average social weights of the agents with a higher income is equal to that of the agents with a smaller
When the weight of the agents with lower α's is larger than the average weight (i.e., p
the optimal income tax redistributes in their favor, increasing after tax income at the bottom, lowering it at the top: the slope of the after tax income curve becomes smaller than 1, in eect creating a positive marginal tax rate. The allocations, without the no-bunching condition of Lemma 2. Werning (2007) also studies the set of second best allocations. 8 We are grateful to an anonymous referee who urged us to investigate the continuity properties of the optimal allocations. redistribution is limited by the fact that the high skilled would fake being low skilled: the incentive constraints binds downwards. Conversely when the social weights of the agents above α is larger than λ, redistribution lowers after tax incomes of types below α (compared to laissez faire) and increases that of types above α: this gives the after tax income curve a slope larger than 1, the marginal tax rate is negative and incentive constraints bind upwards.
3 Utilitarianism and positive marginal tax rates Lemma 2 links the optimal tax rate with the social weights at a regular second best allocation. From (4), the marginal tax rate supported by an agent of type α 0 depends on the average social weight of the agents of type α larger than α 0 . Therefore, to study the sign of the marginal tax rate, we relate the values of the social weights to the objective maximized by the government. Utilitarianism requires a specication of cardinal utilities. A priori the cardinal utility can be any
9 The only requirement for consistency with private choices is that it increases in its rst argument. Any dierence between types can be taken into account through the second argument of K. Since by Lemma 1, incentive compatibility implies that the indirect utility function is nondecreasing in α, K is nondecreasing in α through its rst argument. To keep in line with the literature, we assume that productivity θ p only enters cardinal utility by its impact on U , through α: it is enough for our purpose to restrict ourselves to cardinal utilities of the form K [U, θ c ].
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A utilitarian planner maximizes the sum of the cardinal utility functions
We adopt a utilitarian viewpoint: the cardinal utility is an objective measure of the agents' well being. All the results of course apply to a situation where the function K reects society's value judgments.
10 As pointed out by a referee, formally one does not need the extra degree of freedom given by the parameter θ c to reverse traditional conclusions. It is enough to have a utilitarian function K [U, α] with a rst derivative K U [U R (α), α] which is suciently increasing in its second argument to counteract the eect of the rst argument, so that K U [U R (α), α] is increasing in α. From an economic viewpoint, however, one would need some empirical justication for this unconvincing assumption. The shape of the (non-degenerate) distribution of θ c conditional on α may provide a rationale for the type of phenomena under study, as illustrated in the last section of the paper. 
Under the assumption that labor supply is driven by the one-dimensional parameter α, the optimal schedule only depends on the aggregate weights
To account for income eects, we introduce the modied weights as explained in Section 2:
The above formulas make clear how the cardinal representation plays a role, through its impact on the marginal social value of a change in utility
When K U is increasing in its second argument, large work opportunity costs, holding α constant, go with large social weights: this can be interpreted as if a large opportunity cost comes from a handicap that deserves some social compensation. When K U is decreasing in its second argument, a large opportunity cost of work reduces the social weight, perhaps because non-market time allows enjoyable leisure. All things considered, the quantity of interest is the integral of K U with respect to the conditional distribution F (θ c |α). When K is concave in U , the cardinal utility specication makes society more redistributive than the initial separable U : the social weight K (U ) is decreasing in U . This is the situation considered in Mirrlees of a redistributive government.
Note that a regressive government would not implement positive tax rates.
Consider the case where K[U ] is strictly convex and where the original utility function is linear in consumption (u(R(y)) = R(y)). Then the weight π * a (α) = K (U R (α)) is increasing in α, so that p * (α) is increasing as well. The optimal marginal tax rate is negative everywhere, except at the boundaries! Heterogeneity is not necessary for negative marginal tax rates to be optimal.
Non-negative marginal tax rates and heterogeneity
There are a variety of cases where tax rates are non-negative, even in the presence of heterogeneity. As should be clear from the previous section, a sucient condition is that the average social weights of the agent of characteristics α decreases with α. If the only parameter entering the social utility function is α, this is warranted by the concavity of the welfare index.
11 Otherwise one must put restrictions that bear simultaneously on how the social weight K U varies with θ c and on how the conditional distribution of θ c given α changes with α. Then the function Ψ is decreasing in a, sinceπ, proportional to K U , is. It is decreasing in b by rst order stochastic dominance. It follows that π(α) = Ψ(α, α) is also decreasing in its argument. Multiplying by u (R(y R (α))), which is decreasing in α, yields a decreasing π * (α). at home or on the black market, and therefore low marginal utilities of income.
With this parameterization, π
Suppose, possibly for a large enough k, that it increases on [α, α m ]. One then gets Figure 1 . The agent with the largest social weight is the α m person with lowest productivity and opportunity cost to work. The associated function p * (α), which measures the average height of π * (x) for x larger than α, is represented on the Figure: p * (α) increases whenever it lies above the graph of π * , decreases when it is below the graph, and has an horizontal tangent when it crosses the π * curve.
Also, we know that p * (α) = λ. From (4), in the situation depicted on Figure 1 , all the agents in the segment AB then face negative tax rates.
More generally, there are a number of cases where specic welfare functions would lead to (locally) negative marginal tax rates. Suppose for simplicity that the utility function u is linear in consumption. Consider a situation where productivity θ p is an increasing function of α while the opportunity cost of work θ c is a decreasing function of α: a larger income indicates a larger productivity and a smaller opportunity cost of work. Assume that the cardinal utility puts a high value on the willingness to work, meaning that the derivative K U θ c dθ c / dα is negative and large in absolute value, larger than the absolute value of K U U dU R / dα.
A high enough value would make the optimal income tax regressive.
12 Technically, given α, the distribution of θ 
4.2
May negative marginal tax rates be optimal for low skilled workers?
While the preceding example is illustrative, the distribution of the work opportunity cost conditional on α is degenerate. It is interesting to more generally identify the circumstances where negative marginal tax rates on low incomes are likely to be optimal.
First a theoretical remark is useful. As noted by Saez (2002) , p.1054, negative marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution can only occur if the social weights of the concerned agents are smaller than the average social weight. Indeed, to see negative marginal tax rates bearing on the low incomes,
i.e. in a neighborhood of α, from (4), in the absence of pooling 13 p * (α) has to be larger than λ in this neighborhood. Since by construction p * (α) = λ, assuming dierentiability, this amounts to dp * dα > 0 in a neighborhood of α.
Since by (3) dp
, this occurs when π * , the social weight of the agents, is smaller than λ, the average social weight in the economy, in this neighborhood. In the absence of pooling, a necessary and sucient condition for the low income agents, with α close to α, to face negative marginal tax rates at the optimum is that the social weight π * (α) be smaller than the average social weight in the economy. An expression for this condition can be given, where both the dependence of the social weights on the heterogeneity characteristics and the distribution of θ c conditionally on α interact.
Proposition 3. When the functionsπ * (α, θ c ), F (θ c |α) and G * (α) are twice continuously dierentiable with respect to their arguments, one has
13 Under the assumption that the marginal cost of work is zero at the origin, v y (0, α) = 0, it is easy to show that everybody works at an optimum. Indeed adapting the proof of Lemma 2, a small increase dy in income at the origin does not change the utility but increases the Lagrangian by λ dy. This assumption is satised in the standard example described in footnote 4.
where
is the cross-product 14 of the two gradient vectors ∇F and ∇π * .
Proposition 3 gives an expression for the weight π * (α) in the situation where the distributions are smooth. There are two terms in the formula:
• The second term is positive, from the standard motive of aversion to income inequality. Indeed, from (6),π * (α, θ c ) =π(α, θ c )u (R(y R (α))) and the derivative ∂π * /∂α is typically negative. It is only equal to zero when there are both no desire for redistribution across the α characteristic (the cardinal utility is linear in U and π(α) is constant), and no income eect (u is linear in c).
• The rst term, ∂π * /∂θ c ∂F /∂α, cannot be signed in general. It is equal to zero in a number of cases, for instance if the two parameters are independently distributed (∂F /∂α = 0), or if the social weight does not depend on θ c . Then the marginal tax rate is positive at the bottom of the income distribution. When θ c is rst order stochastically decreasing in α (∂F /∂α ≥ 0)
andπ * is nondecreasing in θ c , then the term is positive, which yields the analog to Proposition 2 at the point α.
In practice, for negative tax rates to be optimal, the rst term must be negative and larger in absolute value than the second one. A special case where this is easier to achieve is when society has no aversion to income inequality (u linear in consumption and K linear in U ). The only redistribution motive then is linked to the θ c parameter,
where φ denotes the density of the marginal distribution of the parameter θ c in the economy. Suppose that K is increasing in the work opportunity cost, so that 14 The cross-product of two vectors of IR 2 is the product of their modulus, multiplied by the sinus of their oriented angle. A simple diagram, noting that ∂F/∂θ c > 0 and ∂π * /∂α < 0,
shows that the angle is between 0 and π under the conditions of Proposition 2.
the government wants to transfer income to the agents with the larger cost. Then the marginal tax rate is negative at α when the conditional distribution of θ c at α is rst order stochastically smaller than the unconditional distribution of θ c .
An illustration using UK data
The following computations are based on UK data. We use annual earnings and marginal tax rate information 15 in the UK for the year 2003. Our starting point is the specication of Brewer, Saez, and Shephard (2008) , which served to compute optimal taxes in the Mirrlees review of the UK tax system. The basic utility function is of the form
(1 + 1/e)α 1/e , with e = .25, and the rst order condition R (y) = (y/α)
1/e allows us to recover the parameter α from earnings and the marginal tax rate. Note that with this specication α is equal to the income that would be observed under laissez-faire. The density of α is obtained from standard kernel estimation, with a rather large bandwidth (¿ 3000) to get smooth drawings. Let θ c stand for a measure of the work opportunity cost. We take as cardinal utility:
so that the government objective is to maximize
With the exponential specication the eect of heterogeneity factors out, and the optimization is easy. Also the social weight of agent (α, θ c ) is proportional to
it is increasing in the work opportunity cost.
We have to make choices on the shape of the distribution of θ c conditional on α, for which we have no guidance from empirical observations. The results that we present are the ones that we found most suggestive, out of a number of experiments. We assume the distribution of θ c , conditional on α, to be normal 15 We thank Andrew Shephard for giving us access to the data set. It is not implausible that the dispersion of work opportunity costs increases with earnings, but we have no evidence to support this assumption. It certainly pushes towards negative marginal tax rates at the bottom of the income distribution. Since
increases with α for all k, k < 1, the weights π(α) will take the shape of Figure 1 , for well chosen parameters. Indeed, as shown in the upper panel of Figure 2 , the marginal tax rate increases with σ(0), and negative tax rates are optimal for σ(0) equal to or smaller than ¿ 100. For small values of k and σ(0), lower weights imply lower transfers to the low income population (R(0) is increasing with σ(0)
as shown in the lower panel).
This example makes clear how lowering the social weights π(α) at the bottom of the income distribution modies the optimal tax schedule: it leads to redistribute away from the bottom towards the middle and the top of the distribution. This involves reducing the income level of the low α types while increasing the slope of the after tax schedule (and therefore the labor supply of these agents)
to maintain or increase the incomes of the middle and upper class.
Notice that, in this example, the distribution of θ c is symmetric (F increasing with σ(α) for negative θ c , decreasing for positive θ c ) and the derivative ∂π * /∂θ c is increasing in θ c . Under such circumstances, the rst term of equation (7), once integrated over θ c , is negative for all α: 
Conclusion
Even keeping with a setup where labor supply is driven by an exogenously predetermined unidimensional combination of the agents' characteristics, heterogeneity in utilities may play an important role in the determination of optimal redistributive schemes. The optimal allocation depends on the average social weights of the agents in the economy, computed conditionally on observable income. Heterogeneity enters through two channels: the individual social weight which depends on the microeconomic characteristics, and the distribution of characteristics conditional on income. We have spelled out this relationship, and applied it to nd conditions under which negative marginal tax rates may be optimal at the bottom of the income distribution. A numerical example indicates that small variations with income of (unobserved) heterogeneity may induce large changes in optimal tax schedules.
using v yα > 0,
which yields incentive compatibility.
The allocation y(α) being nondecreasing admits a right and left limit at every point α. These limits are noted y(α + ) and y(α − ) respectively. Dividing the right inequality of (9) Finally, incentive compatibility and v y < 0 yield for α 1 > α 0 u(R(y(α 1 ))) − u(R(y(α 0 ))) ≥ v(y(α 0 ), α 1 ) − v(y(α 1 ), α 1 ) ≥ 0, implying that R is nondecreasing in α (and in y).
Proof of Lemma 2
We present here a heuristic derivation of the rst order condition (4). To simplify notation, we denote the indirect utility by U rather than U R . According to Lemma 1, U (α) = v α (y(α), α) at all but at most countably many α's. As explained in the above proof, discontinuity points of y correspond to kinks of U . Since v α (y, α) is increasing in y, the inverse function Y (., α) = [v α (., α)] For suciently small a and ∆U , the variation ∆U is admissible, i.e. the allocation Y (U +∆U , α) is increasing in α. At the rst order, the change in the Lagrangian is proportional to ∆U (α). Supposing y continuous at α, ∆L/∆U (α) tends to
as a goes to 0. From the agent's rst order condition u R + v y = 0, the term in square brackets is equal to the marginal tax rate T (y R (α)). By denition, g * (α) = λg(α)/u (R(y R (α))), so that using (2) the last term of 10 is equal to
Using (3) and rearranging terms, it is easy to check that lim ∆L/∆U (α) = 0 is equivalent to (4).
